Tag Archives: Climate Models

Loading the Climate Dice: Why ‘chaos’ does not prevent climate change predictability

Most people have heard about chaos theory, especially as it applies to weather, but may be a little fuzzy about what it all means. They may even hear people claim “if they can’t even predict the weather in a month’s time, how on earth can they tell us what the climate will be in 25 years time?!”.

It’s a fair challenge, but one that has been answered many times by climate scientists [1], but often in ways that perhaps are not as accessible as I feel they could be. When I was recently asked this question I was frustrated I could not share a plain English article with them.

So here is my attempt in plain, non-scientific language to explain how we can project future climate, despite ‘chaos’. I will use the analogy of rolling dice to help explain things – so no equations or mathematical jargon, I promise.

Chaotic Weather

Let’s start with the discovery of ‘chaos’ by Lorenz in 1963 [2]. Weather projections have to start from the current state of the weather and then project forward. The models incrementally step forward to see how the weather patterns evolve over minutes, hours and days. Lorenz discovered that even with the simplest models, if one did two ‘runs’ of the model which had an infinitesimal difference in initial conditions (eg. the temperature in Swindon at 15.0oC and 15.00001oC) the predicted weather can look very different in just a few weeks..

If this was just a trivial observation that errors can magnify themselves in a complex system, one might be tempted to shrug one’s shoulder – and it was not even a new insight [3]. But Lorenz discovered something far more profound: beautiful patterns amongst the chaotic behaviour of complex systems (think of the eddy currents that appear in the turbulent flow of a river). For those interested in learning more about Lorenz’s mathematical legacy, Professor Tim Palmer gave an interesting talk on this [4].

I say ‘errors can magnify’ because sometimes you end up with a chaotic outcome and sometimes you don’t [5]. This is important if you are about to head off to Cornwall for your summer holiday. Weather forecasters now do multiple runs of the models varying the initial parameters [6]. If all the outcomes look similar then the weather system is not behaving chaotically – at least over Cornwall for the period of interest – and the weatherman can say confidently “it will be dry next week over Cornwall”. If, however, out of 100 runs, 20 indicate wet and windy weather, and the rest were dry, they’d say “There is a good chance of dry weather over Cornwall next week, but there is a 20% chance of wet and windy weather”, so take your waterproofs!

Predictable Climate

It really is all about the question being asked, as with most issues in the world. If you ask the wrong question, don’t be surprised if you get a misleading answer.

If I ask the question “will it be sunny in Cornwall on the 3rd of July of 2050?” (wrong question) then it is impossible to say, because of ‘chaos’. If, on the other hand, I ask the question “do we expect the average temperature over Cornwall to be higher in the summer of 2050 as a result of our carbon emissions compared to what it would have been without those emissions?” (longer but valid question) I can answer that question with confidence; it is “Yes”. 

This illustrates that when we talk about weather we are interested, as in our holiday plans or a farmer harvesting their crops, in the specific conditions at a specific place and specific time

Climate is very different, because it is about the averaged conditions over a longer period and typically wider area.

Throwing the dice

I want to illustrate the difference between these two types of question (specific versus averaged) by use of a dice [7] analogy.

If I throw a dice I expect that the chance of getting a 6 to be 1 in 6. If I ask the (specific) question ‘what will the hundredth throw of the dice show?’ (think weather), I am no more certain of the outcome than after 10 throws [8]. 

Now ask a different question: ‘what will be the average number of 6s after 600 throw?’ (think climate). I would expect it to be around about 100. As the number of throws increases I’d expect the average (number of 6s divided by the number of throws)  to get closer and closer to 1 in 6.

This is just how statistics comes to the rescue in the face of the much used, and abused, “chaos” in the climate debate.

You can do this yourself. Make multiple throws of a dice, and after each throw, take the count of the number of 6s thrown and divide by the number of throws – that is the observed odds. You might be surprised to find how long it takes before the odds settles down to close to  1 in 6.

Being lazy, I wrote a little program to plot the result (using a random number generator to do the ‘throwing’ for me). 

The averaged number of 6s converges on the expected odds of 1/6 (shorthand for ‘1 in 6’).

I then imagined two dice, one that was ‘fair’ (where the odds of throwing a 6 were 1 in 6) and a ‘loaded’ dice (where the odds have changed to 1 in 5). This is a analogy for a changed climate where carbon emissions have been happening for some time but have now stopped, and there is a raised but stable concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This gives rise to a higher averaged temperature, represented by the higher odds of throwing a 6 in this analogy (see next illustration).

Despite the uncertainty in any specific throw (think weather) in both cases, the average chance of getting a 6 can be predicted (think climate) in both cases. We can see the loaded dice clearly in the graph, compared to the fair dice. In both cases it takes a little time for the influence of randomness (chaos if you like) to fade away as the number of throws increases.

However, the emissions have not stopped, and in fact have been growing since the start of the industrial revolution. There has been a significant acceleration in emissions in the last 75 years. So the amount of accumulated greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has been growing, and with it, the averaged surface temperature on Earth. 

So, taking the analogy one step further,  I created a dice that gets progressively more ‘loaded’ over time (think each year of emissions). 

Now, the averaged chance of throwing a 6 will progressively increase, compared to the fair dice. This is illustrated in the next graphic.

 Again, we see the averaged odds after a number of throws jump around for quite a while (think chaos), but things settle down after a several hundred throws. 

We now see a clear and ever widening gap between the two dice. 

This is analogous to what is happening with our climate: our continuing carbon emissions are progressively loading the ‘climate dice’.

No amount of weather chaos can cancel the climate statistics that become more evident with every year that passes.

Extreme Weather Events

Now while weather and climate are different, because climate is an average of what the weather is over time, there is an interesting flip-side to this. Since the climate changes due to our carbon emissions, that means the spread of possible weather must have also shifted, to generate a new average.

This means that extreme weather events become much more likely. 

Once again, this is just basic statistics. So events that may have been “one in a hundred years” become much more frequent, and very extreme events, like the 40oC we saw in England in 2022, that were “basically impossible” without our carbon emissions [9], now start to happen.

I don’t want to make this essay longer explaining how this works, and the Royal Statistical Society have done a great job on this, so please visit their explainer [10].

Extreme weather events are now popping up all over the world, almost on a weekly basis, and thanks to the statistics and associated modelling, scientists can now put a number on how much more likely each event has become due to our carbon emissions [11].

We have already loaded the climate dice, the question now is, how much more do we want to load it, and make the odds even worse?

© Richard W. Erskine, September 2025

Notes

  1. Chaos and Climate, James Annan and William Connolley, RealClimate, 4th Nov 2005.https://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2005/11/chaos-and-climate/
  2. Edward Lorenz, Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow, Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences. 20 (2): 130–141, https://journals.ametsoc.org/view/journals/atsc/20/2/1520-0469_1963_020_0130_dnf_2_0_co_2.xml
  3. Stephen Wolfram wrote some historical notes on chaos theory https://www.wolframscience.com/reference/notes/971c/ 
  4. The Butterfly Effect – What Does It Really Signify, Tim Palmer, Oxford Mathematics, 19th May 2017, https://youtu.be/vkQEqXAz44I?si=bLBWR7hLNsHBaE5E
  5. Over the specific place and time period of interest, of course.
  6. This is called ‘ensemble modelling’. 
  7. For the grammar police: common usage now prefers ‘dice’ for singular and plural cases.
  8. In this sense, the dice analogy is somewhat different to climate, because climate change is conditional on what came before, but this does not change the point of the analogy – to distinguish between specific and averaged questions.
  9. UK’s 40oC heatwave ‘basically impossible’ without climate change, Georgina Rannard, 29th July 2022, BBC, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-62335975 
  10. Explainer: Extreme Weather, Royal Statistical Society, https://rss.org.uk/policy-campaigns/policy/climate-change-resources/explainer-extreme-weather 
  11. World Weather Attribution, https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/ 

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Stop demanding certainty from climate models: we know enough to act

‘Climate Models Can’t Explain What’s Happening to Earth: Global warming is moving faster than the best models can keep a handle on’ is the headline of an article in The Atlantic by Zoë Schlanger [1]

The content of the article does not justify the clickbait headline, which should instead read

‘Climate Models Haven’t Yet Explained an anomalous Global Mean Surface Temperature in 2023’.

Gavin Schmidt authored an earlier comment piece in Nature [2] with a similarly hyped up title (“can’t” is not the same as “haven’t yet”). He states very clearly in a discussion with Andy Revkin [3], that he fully expects the anomaly to be explained in due course through retrospective modelling using additional data. It’s worth noting that Zeke Hausfather (who also appears on Revkin’s discussion) said in an Carbon Brief article [4] that 2023 “is broadly in line with projections from the latest generation of climate models” and that there is “a risk of conflating shorter-term climate variability with longer-term changes – a pitfall that the climate science community has encountered before”.

It is not surprising there are anomalous changes in a single year. After all, climate change was historically considered by climate science as a discernible change in averaged weather over a 30 year period, precisely to eliminate inter-annual variability! Now, we have been pumping man-made carbon emissions into the atmosphere at such an unprecedented rate we don’t have to wait 30 years to see the signal.

If you look at the historical record of global mean surface temperature, it goes up and down for a lot of reasons. A lot of it has to do with the heat churning through the oceans, sometimes burping some heat out, sometimes swallowing some, but not creating additional heat. So the trend line is clearly rising and the models are excellent in modelling the trend line. The variations are superimposed on a rising trend. Nothing to see here, at this level of discussion.

The climate scientists are also, usually, pretty good at anticipating the ups and down that come from El Nino, La Nina, Volcanic eruptions, etc. (Gavin Schmidt and others do annual ‘forecasts’ of the expected variability based on this knowledge). Which triggered the concern at not seeing 2023 coming, but why expect to get it right 100% of the time?

Don’t confuse this area of investigation with extreme weather attribution, which addresses regional (ie. sub-global) and time limited (less than a year) extreme events. Weather is not climate, but climate influences weather. So it is possible using a combination of historic weather data and climate models to put a number on the probability of an extreme event and compare it with how probable it has been in the past. So, 100 year events can become 10 year events, for example. This is what the World Weather Attribution service provides. The rarer the event, the greater the uncertainties (because of less historic data to work with), but it is clear that in many cases extreme weather events are becoming more frequent in our warming world, which is no surprise at all, based purely on statistical reasoning (The Royal Statistical Society explain here.)

So back to The Atlantic piece.

The issue I feel is that journalists and lay people can’t abide uncertainty. What are the scientists not telling us! In general people want certainty and often they will choose based mostly on their own values and biases rather than expert judgment. In the case of the 2023 anomaly, the choice seems to be between “it’s certainly much worse than the modellers can model”, “it’s certainly catastrophic”, “it’s certainly ok, nothing to see here”, or something else. All without defining “it’s” or providing any margin of error on “certainty”. Whereas scientists have to navigate uncertainty every day.

The fact is that we know a lot but not everything. There is a spectrum between complete certainty and complete ignorance. On this spectrum, we know:

  • a lot ‘that is established beyond any doubt’ (e.g. increasing carbon dioxide emissions will increase global mean surface temperatures);
  • other things that ‘are established outcomes, but currently with uncertainties as to how much and how fast’ (e.g. sea-level rise as a result of global warming and melting of ice sheets, that will continue long after we get to net zero; before it reaches some yet to be determined new equilibrium/ level);
  • and others that ‘currently, have huge uncertainties attached to them’ (e.g. the net amount of carbon in the biosphere that will be released into the atmosphere through a combination of a warming planet, agriculture and other changes – we don’t even know for sure if it’s net positive or negative by 2050 at this stage given the uncertainties in negative and positive contributions).

So we can explain a lot about what’s happening to Earth, we just have to accept that there are areas which have significant uncertainties attached to them currently, and in some cases maybe forever. Not knowing some things is not the same as knowing nothing, and not the same as not being able to refine our approaches either to reduce the levels of uncertainty, or to find ways to address those uncertainties (e.g. through adaptation) to mitigate their impacts. Don’t put it all on climate models to do all the lifting here.

The current climate projections are much more precise than say the projections on stock market prices in 5 or 10 years, but we don’t use the latter as angst ridden debate about the unpredictability of the markets. We consider the risks and take action. On climate, we have enough data to make decisions in many areas (e.g. when it would be prudent to build a new, larger Thames Barrage), by using a hybrid form of decision making within which the climate models are just one input. Even at the prosaic level of our dwellings, we manage risk. I didn’t wait for certainty as to when the old gas boiler would pack up before we installed a super efficient heat pump – no, we did it prudently well beforehand – to avoid the risk of being forced into a bad decision (getting a new gas boiler). We managed the risks.

Climate models have been evolving to include more aspects of the Earth System and how these are coupled together and to enhance the granularity of the modelling (see Resources), but there is no suggestion that there is some missing process that is required to explain the 2023 uptick but probably missing data; not the same thing. Although there is a side commentary in [4] involving input from Professor Tim Palmer calling for ‘exa-scale’ computing, but Gavin Schmidt pushes back on the cost-effectiveness of such a path; there are many questions we must address and can with current models.

There are always uncertainties based on a whole range of factors (both model generated ones, and socio-economic inputs e.g. how fast will we stop burning fossil fuels in our homes and cars; that’s a model input not a model design issue). There is possibly nothing to see here (in 2023 anomaly), but it could be something significant. It certainly doesn’t quite justify the hyperbole of the The Atlantic’s headline.

If we globally are waiting for ‘certainty’ before we are prepared to act with urgency, we are completely misunderstanding how we should be managing the risks of man-made global warming.

We certainly should not, at this stage at least, be regarding what happened in 2023 as an extra spur to action. Don’t blame climate models for not having raised a red flag before or urgently enough – which is the subtext of the angst over 2023.

The climate scientists will investigate and no doubt tell us why 2023 was anomalous – merely statistical variability or something else – in due course. It is not really a topic where the public has even the slightest ability to contribute meaningfully to resolving the question. It might be better if instead The Atlantic was publishing pieces addressing the issue of what questions climate models should be addressing (e.g. constrasting the building of sea walls, managed retreat and other responses to sea level rise), where everyone can and should have a voice (as Erica Thompson discusses in her book [5]).

Climate scientists have been issuing the warning memo for decades, at least since the 1979 Charney Report, with broadly the same message. We read the memo, but then failed to act with anything like the urgency and agency required. Don’t blame them or their models for the lack of action. Ok, so the advance of models has allowed more diverse questions to be addressed (e.g. trends in flooding risks), but the core message remains essentially the same.

And please, don’t use 2023 as another pearl clutching moment for another ‘debate’ about how terrible things are, and how we need more research to enable us to take action; but then turn our heads away again. Until the next headline, of course.

(c) Richard W. Erskine, 2025

REFERENCES

  1. ‘Climate Models Can’t Explain What’s Happening to Earth: Global warming is moving faster than the best models can keep a handle on’, Zoë Schlanger, 6th January 2025, The Atlantic.
  2. ‘Climate models can’t explain 2023’s huge heat anomaly — we could be in uncharted territory’, Gavin Schmidt, 19h March 2024, Nature, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-024-00816-z
  3. ‘Factcheck: Why the recent ‘acceleration’ in global warming is what scientists expect’, Zeke Hausfather, 4th April 2024, https://www.carbonbrief.org/factcheck-why-the-recent-acceleration-in-global-warming-is-what-scientists-expect/ 
  4. ANDY REVKIN speaks with longtime NASA climate scientist GAVIN SCHMIDT about his Nature commentary on what missing factors may be behind 2023’s shocking ocean and atmosphere temperature spikes, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/live/AYknM2qtRp4?si=fsq0y-XkYG58ITw5 
  5. ‘Escape from Model Land: How mathematical models can lead us astray and what we can do about it’, Erica Thompson, 2022, Basic Books.

SOME RESOURCES ON CLIMATE MODEL EVOLUTION

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